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Property rights are central to debates about natural resource policy. Which in-
dividual, group, or entity should hold the rights to a resource? Until three decades
ago, the accepted answer was generally “the government”. A widespread view-
point today is that with private ownership of resources, owners experience directly
the costs and benefits of their decisions and thus, under the logic of the market,
will use their resources wisely. The aim of this paper is to look at the controver-
sies over the superiority of private vs. common property from the standpoint of
the theory of economic growth.
To do this, we propose two models of economic growth with heterogeneous
consumers and exhaustible resources differing in property regimes. These models
are modifications to a well-known Ramsey-type model of economic growth with
exhaustible resources (see, e.g., Heal et al. (1974)). Our goal is to describe pos-
sible effects of different property regimes on the resource utilization rate and the
rate of growth.
The first model assumes private ownership of resource stocks (mines, oilfields
etc.) perceived by consumers as assets which they can buy and sell and in which
they can invest their savings. This implies that the resource owners can earn a
rent. The second model supposes common property, with resource stocks owned
collectively (e.g., Heltberg (2002); Ostrom and Hess (2007)), and the resource
rent equally divided among all the consumers.
Following Becker (1980) we assume that consumers are heterogeneous in
their intertemporal preferences. Discount factors are higher for more patient con-
sumers and lower for less patient ones.
First we consider the model with private property. In this model, in the long
run all capital and resources belong to the most patient consumers. We show that
the discount factor of the most patient consumers determines the long-run rate of
resource utilization and the long-run rate rate of growth, the rate of resource uti-
lization being decreasing and the rate of growth increasing in the discount factor
of the most patient consumers.
Then we pass to the model with common property. In this model, consumer
heterogeneity leads to different preferences on the rate of resource extraction,
since less patient consumers prefer the resources to be extracted faster than the
more patient consumers. The resource extraction rate is chosen by voting. Our
approach to voting in a dynamic framework is borrowed from Borissov et al.
(2010)∗. We prove that in the model with common property it is the discount
∗The performance of majoritarian institutions in dynamic settings has attracted growing interest
and attention in recent years (see e.g. Baron (1996); Krusell et al. (1997); Cooley and Soares (1999);
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factor of the median voter that determines the long-run resource utilization rate
and the long-run rate of growth. It is interesting to notice that the latter does not
depend on the discount factor of the most patient consumers.
It follows that the long-run rate of growth in the case of private ownership of
natural resources is less than or equal to the long-run rate of growth in the case
of common ownership. However, this conclusion is subject to some reservations.
More specifically, we show that if discount factors are endogenous, under some
circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is devoted to the model with pri-
vate property to resources. We define equilibrium paths, fully characterize steady-
state equilibria and derive an explicit formula for the equilibrium rate of growth.
In section 2, we develop the model with common resource stocks, describe our
approach to voting, characterize steady state voting equilibria and derive a for-
mula the the long-run rate of growth. In section 3, we modify our models by
introducing endogenous time preferences.
1. Economic growth model with private ownership of resource stocks
1.1. Consumers
Suppose that there is an odd number L of consumers. The consumers live for an
infinite period of time and are identical in all respect except their discount factors.
Each time each consumer supply one unit of labor force in the labor market. Thus
the total labor supply at each time is L.
The utility function of consumer i is of the form
∞∑
t=0
β ti u(Ci,t),
where βi is the discount factor of this consumer and Ci,t is his consumption at time
t. We assume that u(C) = ln C.
We suppose the households to be sorted in ascending order of their discount
factors:
0 < β1 ≤ β2 ≤ · · · ≤ βL ≡ βmax < 1.
By J we denote the set of agents with the highest discount factor:
J = {i = 1, . . . , L | βi = βL}.
Rangel (2003); Bernheim and Slavov (2009)). Without going into detail, notice that our approach to
voting is different from the approaches accepted in these papers.
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The budget constraints of consumer i are of the following form
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 + rt) S i,t−1 + Wt, S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1. (1)
Here rt and Wt are the interest and wage rates at time t, and S i,t are the savings
of consumer i at time t. Consumers are prohibited to borrow against their future
wage earnings. Therefore, their savings must be non-negative. They can be in-
vested in physical capital as well as in natural resources. According to Hotelling’s
rule (Hotelling (1931), see also Stiglitz (1974)) the return to the investments into
phisical capital and into natural resources must be equal in equilibrium. Hence,
the resource price Pt in equilibrium grows at the rate rt:
Pt = (1 + rt) Pt−1, t = 0, 1, . . . .
Initially consumer i is supposed to be endowed with some amount of physical
capital Kˆi,0 and some amount of natural resources Rˆi,0 which are assumed to be
given. Therefore at the initial time t = 0 the savings of consumer i are
S i,−1 = P−1Rˆi,0 + Kˆi,0 ≥ 0
where P−1 is the price of natural resources at time t = −1.
1.2. Production
We assume that output Yt at each time t is given by the Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yt = AtK
α1
t L
α2 Eα3t , α j > 0, j = 1, 2, 3,
3∑
j=1
α j = 1, (2)
where At is the coefficient of total factor productivity, Kt is the physical capital
stock at time t, L is the labor supply, and Et is the volume of extraction of ex-
haustible resources. Capital fully depreciates during one time period. The total
factor productivity grows at an exogenously given rate λ:
At = (1 + λ)t .
The resources expended for production decrease their available stock:
Rt+1 = Rt − Et, t = 0, 1, . . . .
We denote by ρt the resource extraction rate: ρt = Et/Rt, so that
Et = ρtRt.
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1.3. Equilibrium paths and steady-state equilibria
Suppose that we are given an initial state represented by an initial distribution
of physical capital
(
Kˆi,0
)
i=1,...,L
and natural resources
(
Rˆi,0
)
i=1,...,L
among the con-
sumers. We assume that
Kˆi,0 ≥ 0, Rˆi,0 ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , L,
Kˆ0 ≡
L∑
i=1
Kˆi,0 > 0, Rˆ0 ≡
L∑
i=1
Rˆi,0 > 0.
and define an equilibrium path starting from the initial state
(
Kˆi,0, Rˆi,0
)
i=1,...,L
as a
sequence {
K∗t ,R
∗
t , 1 + r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , P
∗
t , E
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
such that
1) for each i = 1, . . . , L, the sequence
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
t=0,1,...
is a solution to the fol-
lowing problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(Ci,t), (3)
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 + rt) S i,t−1 + It, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . .
at rt = r∗t , pit = pi∗t , It = W∗t , and
S i,−1 =
P∗0Rˆi,0
1 + r∗0
+ Kˆi,0;
2) capital is paid its marginal product:
1 + r∗t =
α1AtLα2 E∗t
α3
K∗t
1−α1 , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where K∗0 = Kˆ0;
3) labor is paid its marginal product:
W∗t =
α2AtK∗t
α1 E∗t
α3
L1−α2
, t = 0, 1, . . . ;
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4) the price of exhaustible resources is equal to their marginal product:
P∗t =
α3AtK∗t
α1 Lα2
E∗t
1−α3 , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
5) Hotelling’s rule holds true:
P∗t+1 =
(
1 + r∗t+1
)
P∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
6) total consumer savings are equal to the investments into physical capital
and exhaustible resources
L∑
i=1
S ∗i,t = P
∗
t R
∗
t+1 + K
∗
t+1, t = 0, 1, . . . ;
7) the natural balance of exhaustible resources is fulfilled
R∗t+1 = R
∗
t − E∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where R∗0 = Rˆ0.
We make our emphasis on steady-state equilibria. They are defined as follows.
A tuple {
γ∗, ρ∗,K∗,R∗, 1 + r∗,W∗, P∗, E∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is called a steady-state equilibrium if the sequence{
K∗t ,R
∗
t , 1 + r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , P
∗
t , E
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given for t = 0, 1, . . . and i = 1, . . . , L by
K∗t = (1 + γ
∗)tK∗, 1 + r∗t = 1 + r
∗,
W∗t = (1 + γ
∗)tW∗, P∗t = (1 + r
∗)t P∗,
R∗t = (1 − ρ∗)t R∗, E∗t = (1 − ρ∗)t E∗,
C∗i,t = (1 + γ
∗)tC∗i , S
∗
i,t = (1 + γ
∗)tS ∗i ,
is an equilibrium path for some initial state.
Suppose that for some r, I, γ,
rt = r, It = (1 + γ)tI, t = 0, 1, . . .
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We call a couple
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
a balanced optimum of consumer i if the sequence(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)∞
t=0
given by
C∗i,t = (1 + γ)
t C∗i , S
∗
i,t = (1 + γ)
t S ∗i , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
is a solution to problem (3) at Sˆ i,−1 = (1 + γ)−1 S ∗i .
It is clear that a tuple{
γ∗, ρ∗,K∗,R∗, 1 + r∗,W∗, P∗, E∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if
1 + r∗ =
α1Lα2 E∗α3
K∗1−α1
, W∗ =
α2K∗α1 E∗α3
L1−α2
, P∗ =
α3K∗α1 Lα2
E∗1−α3
, (4)
(1 + γ∗)
(
P∗R∗
1 + r∗
+ K∗
)
=
L∑
i=1
S ∗i , (5)
E∗ = ρ∗R∗, (6)
(1 + γ∗)1−α1 = (1 + λ) (1 − ρ∗)α3 , (7)
1 + r∗ =
1 + γ∗
1 − ρ∗ , (8)
and, for each i = 1, . . . , L, the couple
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
is a balanced optimum of consumer
i at r = r∗, γ = γ∗, and I = W∗.
To describe properties of steady-state equilibria we formulate the following
simple lemma.
Lemma 1. Given r, I, and γ,
1) a balanced optimum of consumer i exists if and only if
βi ≤ 1 + γ1 + r ;
2) if
βi =
1 + γ
1 + r
,
then any couple
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
such that
C∗i + S
∗
i + =
1 + r
1 + γ
S ∗i + I, C
∗
i ≥ 0, S ∗i ≥ 0
is a balanced optimum of consumer i;
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3) if
βi <
1 + γ
1 + r
,
then there is a unique balanced optimum of consumer i,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
; it is given
by C∗i = I, S
∗
i = 0.
Now we can formulate an important proposition describing the structure of
steady-state equilibria. It follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. A tuple{
γ∗, ρ∗,K∗,R∗, 1 + r∗,W∗, P∗, E∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if it satisfies conditions (4)–(8) and
βmax =
1 + γ∗
1 + r∗
,
C∗i + S
∗
i =
1 + r
1 + γ
S ∗i + W
∗, C∗i ≥ 0, S ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ J,
C∗i = W, C
∗
i ≥ 0, S ∗i = 0, i < J.
To prove this proposition it is sufficient to repeat a well-known argument
by Becker (1980, 2006). It allows us to note the following:
• The equilibrium resource extraction rate is determined by the patience of
the most patient consumers:
ρ∗ = 1 − βmax.
The more patient are these consumers, the lower is the resource extraction
rate.
• The growth rate is determined by the rate of technological change and the
discount factor of the most patient consumer
1 + γ∗ =
[
(1 + λ) βα3max
] 1
1−α1 .
The higher is patience of the most patient consumers, the higher is the
growth rate.
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2. Economic growth model with common ownership of resources
In this section we propose a model of economic growth with heterogeneous agents
and common resource stocks. The income obtained from the sale of the ex-
haustible resource is equally distributed among the consumers. Consumers choose
resource extraction rate by voting. We describe equilibrium paths in the basic
Ramsey-type model and after that introduce voting procedure and define voting
equilibrium.
We maintain our earlier assumptions and rewrite the budget constraints (1) of
consumer i as follows
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 + rt) S i,t−1 + Wt + Ωt, S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1
Here rt is the interest time t, and S i,t are the savings of consumer i at time t in-
vested in physical capital. Consumer’s income includes the wage Wt and resource
income Ωt, which is the per capita income from the sale of the extracted resource
equally distributed among the consumers.
2.1. Equilibrium paths and steady-state equilibria
As in section 1.3, first we define equilibrium paths. Suppose that a sequence
R = (ρt)∞t=0 of resource extraction rates is given. The initial state is given by a
tuple of initial savings
{
Sˆ i,−1
}
i=1,...,L
such that
Sˆ i,−1 ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , L,
L∑
i=1
Sˆ i,−1 > 0,
and the initial stock of exhaustible resource Rˆ0 > 0. We define an equilibrium
path starting from the initial state
{(
Sˆ i,−1
)
i=1,...,L
, Rˆ0
}
as a sequence{
K∗∗t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
such that
1) for each i = 1, . . . , L, the sequence
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
t=0,1,...
is a solution to prob-
lem (3) at rt = r∗∗t , It = W∗∗t + Ω∗∗t , S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1;
2) aggregate savings are equal to the capital stock
K∗∗t =
L∑
i=1
S ∗∗i,t−1, t = 0, 1, . . . ;
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3) capital is paid its marginal product:
1 + r∗∗t =
α1AtLα2 E∗∗t
α3
K∗∗t
1−α1 , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
4) labor is paid its marginal product:
W∗∗t =
α2AtK∗∗t
α1 E∗∗t
α3
L1−α2
, t = 0, 1, . . .
5) the resource income is given by
Ω∗∗t =
P∗∗t E∗∗t
L
, t = 0, 1, . . . ;
6) the price of the exhaustible resources is equal to their marginal product
P∗∗t =
α3AtK∗∗t
α1 Lα2
E∗∗t
1−α3 , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
7) the extraction of resource is determined by
E∗∗t = ρtR
∗∗
t , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
8) the natural balance of exhaustible resource is fulfilled
R∗∗t+1 = R
∗∗
t − E∗∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where R∗∗0 = Rˆ0.
To describe steady-state equilibria suppose that the resource extraction rate is
constant over time: ρt = ρ, t = 0, 1, . . .
A tuple{
γ∗∗,K∗∗,R∗∗, 1 + r∗∗,W∗∗,Ω∗∗, P∗∗, pi∗∗, E∗∗,
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is called a steady-state equilibrium if the sequence{
K∗∗t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given for t = 0, 1, . . . and i = 1, . . . , L by
K∗∗t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tK∗∗, 1 + r∗∗t = 1 + r
∗∗,
W∗∗t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tW∗∗, Ω∗∗t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tΩ∗∗,
P∗∗t = (1 + pi
∗∗)t P∗∗, R∗∗t = (1 − ρ)t R∗∗, E∗∗t = (1 − ρ)t E∗∗,
C∗∗i,t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tC∗∗i , S
∗∗
i,t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tS ∗∗i ,
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is an equilibrium path. Here we do not suppose that Hotelling’s rule holds true.
Under some circumstances it may be that pi∗∗ , r∗∗.
It is clear that for any constant over time resource extraction rate, ρ, a tuple{
γ∗∗,K∗∗,R∗∗, 1 + r∗∗,W∗∗,Ω∗∗, P∗∗, pi∗∗, E∗∗,
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if
1 + r∗∗ =
α1Lα2 E∗∗α3
K∗∗1−α1
, W∗∗ =
α2K∗∗α1 E∗∗α3
L1−α2
, (9)
Ω∗∗ =
P∗∗E∗∗
L
, P∗∗ =
α3K∗∗α1 Lα2
E∗∗1−α3
, (10)
(1 + γ∗∗) K∗∗ =
L∑
i=1
S ∗∗i , (11)
E∗∗ = ρR∗∗, (12)
(1 + γ∗∗)1−α1 = (1 + λ) (1 − ρ)α3 , (13)
1 + γ∗∗ = (1 + pi∗∗) (1 − ρ) , (14)
and, for each i = 1, . . . , L, the couple
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
is a balanced optimum of con-
sumer i at r = r∗∗, γ = γ∗∗, and I = W∗∗ + Ω∗∗.
Lemma 1 can be readily applied to the model under consideration. The fol-
lowing proposition describing the structure of steady-state equilibrium follows
from Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. Let a constant over time resource extraction rate, ρ, be given. A
tuple {
γ∗∗,K∗∗,R∗∗, 1 + r∗∗,W∗∗,Ω∗∗, P∗∗, pi∗∗, E∗∗,
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if it satisfies conditions (9)–(14) and
βmax =
1 + γ∗∗
1 + r∗∗
, (15)
C∗∗i + S
∗∗
i =
1 + r∗∗
1 + γ∗∗
S ∗∗i + W
∗∗ + Ω∗∗, C∗∗i ≥ 0, S ∗∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ J, (16)
C∗∗i = W
∗∗ + Ω∗∗, C∗∗i ≥ 0, S ∗∗i = 0, i < J. (17)
This proposition can be proved in the same way as Proposition 2. It says that
only the most patient consumers make positive savings and own all the capital.
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2.2. Voting equilibria
Here we introduce a voting procedure into our model. Consider an equilibrium
path {
K∗∗t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
and ask each consumer i, weather he prefers to increase or decrease the resource
extraction rate ρt at time t. We assume that when answering this question con-
sumers take into account the fact that additional resource extracted at time t can
be sold, used for production and possibly increase their consumption via corre-
sponding part of the resource rent and via increase of factors income. On the other
hand, the resource utilized at time t decrease the resource stock available in the
future.
To describe consumers’ decision-making, first note that for each i,
(C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t )t=0,1,... is a solution to the following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
β ti u(Ci,t), (18)
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ AtK∗∗t α1 Lα2 E∗∗t α3
(
α1S t−1
K∗∗t
+
α2 + α3
L
)
,
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1. Recall that
E∗∗t = ρtR
∗∗
t and hence R
∗∗
t = Rˆ0
t−1∏
j=0
(
1 − ρ j
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . . (19)
Let us consider the value of (18), Vi, as a function of R = (ρt)∞t=0. Defining
consumers’ decision-making procedure we assume that the attitude of consumer
i to a possible change in ρt is determined by sign of the derivative ∂Vi/ ∂ρt, if
it exists. Namely, if ∂Vi/ ∂ρt > 0, consumer i is in favor of increasing ρt. If
∂Vi/ ∂ρt < 0, consumer i is in favor of decreasing ρt.
Definition 1. We call a sequence{
ρ∗∗t ,K
∗∗
t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
a voting equilibrium path if{
K∗∗t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
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is an equilibrium path at R = (ρ∗∗t )∞t=0 and for each t the number of consumers
who are in favor of increasing ρt and the number of those who are in favor of
decreasing ρt is less than L/2.
Here we certainly do not mean that the individuals votes for any change in the
resource extraction rate. The idea is that the government controlling the resource
stock responds somehow to the wishes of the majority when choosing the resource
extraction rate.
We will not discuss an existence and properties of voting equilibria in a gen-
eral form, but will describe voting steady-state equilibria.
Definition 2. If the sequence{
ρ∗∗t ,K
∗∗
t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given by
ρ∗∗t = ρ
∗∗, K∗∗t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tK∗∗, 1 + r∗∗t = 1 + r
∗∗,
W∗∗t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tW∗∗, Ω∗∗t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tΩ∗∗,
P∗∗t = (1 + pi
∗∗)t P∗∗, R∗∗t = (1 − ρ∗∗)t R∗∗, E∗∗t = (1 − ρ∗∗)t E∗∗,
C∗∗i,t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tC∗∗i , S
∗∗
i,t = (1 + γ
∗∗)tS ∗∗i ,
i = 1, . . . , L, t = 0, 1, . . .
forms a voting equilibrium path, then the tuple{
ρ∗∗, γ∗∗,K∗∗,R∗∗, 1 + r∗∗,W∗∗,Ω∗∗, P∗∗, pi∗∗, E∗∗,
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is called a voting steady-state equilibrium.
The following theorem describes voting steady-state equilibria. It reads that an
important role in determining a steady-state equilibrium is played by the median
consumer m = (L + 1)/2.
Theorem 1. A tuple{
ρ∗∗, γ∗∗,K∗∗,R∗∗, 1 + r∗∗,W∗∗,Ω∗∗, P∗∗, pi∗∗, E∗∗,
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
represents a voting steady-state equilibrium, if and only if it satisfies conditions
(9)–(14) at ρ = ρ∗∗, where ρ∗∗ = 1 − βm.
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Proof. Let{
γ∗∗,K∗∗,R∗∗, 1 + r∗∗,W∗∗,Ω∗∗, P∗∗, pi∗∗, E∗∗,
(
C∗∗i , S
∗∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
be a steady-state equilibrium constructed at ρ = ρ∗∗ and{
K∗∗t ,R
∗∗
t , 1 + r
∗∗
t ,W
∗∗
t ,Ω
∗∗
t , P
∗∗
t , E
∗∗
t ,
(
C∗∗i,t , S
∗∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
be an equilibrium path corresponding to this steady-state equilibrium.
By the envelope theorem, taking into account (19), for all i = 1, . . . , L and all
t = 0, 1, . . ., we have
∂Vi
∂ρt
= βtiu
′ (C∗∗i,t ) α3Φ∗∗tρt −
∞∑
k=t+1
βki u
′ (C∗∗i,k) α3Φ∗∗k1 − ρt ,
where
Φ∗∗t = AtK
∗∗
t
α1 Lα2 E∗∗t
α3
(
α1S ∗∗t−1
K∗∗t
+
α2 + α3
L
)
.
Also we have
Φ∗∗t+1 = (1 + γ
∗∗)Φ∗∗t , C
∗∗
i,t+1 = (1 + γ
∗∗)C∗∗i,t , u
′ (C∗∗i,t+1) = u′(C∗∗i,t )1 + γ∗∗ .
Therefore,
∂Vi
∂ρt
= α3β
t
iΦ
∗∗
t u
′ (C∗∗i,t ) [ 1ρt − βi(1 − βi) (1 − ρt)
]
and hence
sign
∂Vi
∂ρt
= sign {1 − βi − ρt}
To complete the proof it is sufficient to notice that
∂Vi
∂ρt
T 0 ⇔ βi S 1 − ρt.

It follows that
• The long-run equilibrium resource extraction rate is determined by the pa-
tience of the median consumer:
ρ∗∗ = 1 − βm.
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• Hotelling’s rule Hotelling (1931), implying that the resource prices grow
with the rate equal to the interest rate pi∗∗ = r∗∗ may be violated:
1 + r∗∗
1 + pi∗∗
=
βm
βmax
.
Indeed, if βm < βmax, then pi∗∗ is larger than the interest rate r∗∗. See Cher-
mak and Patrick (2002) for a discussion of Hotelling’s rule applicability to
observable price dynamics.
• The long-run rate of growth is determined by the rate of technological
change and the patience of the median consumer
1 + γ∗∗ =
[
(1 + λ) βα3m
] 1
1−α1 .
It is interesting to note that the discount factor of the most patient consumers
βmax does not influence the steady state rate of growth though it impacts the
interest rate.
3. Endogenous time preferences
It seems reasonable to make the conclusion from our results that in all conditions
private ownership of exhaustible resources is more favorable for economic growth
than common ownership. However, this conclusion is somewhat hasty. The point
is that private ownership, other thing being equal, leads to higher level of income
inequality than common ownership. At the same time, it is generally recognized
(see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1996)) that income inequality, by fuelling social
discontent, increases sociopolitical instability and insecurity of property rights
and the latter, by creating uncertainty in the politico-economic environment, can
reduce investment and economic growth. Thus, if private ownership of natural
resources leads to a high level of income inequality, it can result in sociopolitical
instability and hence in a higher rate of resource extraction† and a lower rate of
growth than common ownership.
To model this possibility, let us slightly modify our model and, following
Borissov and Lambrecht (2009), make the assumption that the discount factors are
formed endogenously. More precisely, let us assume that the objective function
of consumer i is of the following form:
∞∑
t=0
[(1 − p)βi]tu(Ci,t),
†Similar reasoning on the impact of the insecurity of property rights on the extraction rate can be
found Gaddy and Ickes (2005).
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where p is a social objective magnitude reflecting a detrimental effect of so-
cial tension, political instability and insecurity of property rights on the econ-
omy. We assume p = ψ(η), where η is a measure of income inequality and
ψ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a continuous function equal to 0 at η smaller than some
ηˆ > 0 and increasing for η > ηˆ. It should be noticed that on a non-balanced
equilibrium path the income inequality and p change over time. However, on a
balanced-growth path they are constant over time. On a balanced-growth path the
income distribution depends on the fraction σ = |J|/N of the most patient con-
sumers in the population and the distribution of savings across the set of most
patient consumers. To simplify our argument, let us restrict our consideration
to the simple case where the savings across the most patient consumers are dis-
tributed evenly. In this case it is natural to take the following measure of income
inequality:
η = α(1 − σ),
where α = α1 in the case of common ownership of natural resources and α =
α1 + α3 in the case of private ownership of natural resources. It is not difficult
to check that α(1 − σ) is a good approximation to the Gini coefficient of income
inequality and is equal to the latter if the set of consumers is a continuum.
It is not difficult to check that if we assume that η = α(1 − σ) and hence
p = ψ[α(1 − σ)], then, in the case of private ownership of exhaustible resources
the equilibrium long-run rate of growth, γ∗, is determined by
1 + γ∗ = 1 +
{
(1 + λ)
{[
1 − ψ [(α1 + α3) (1 − σ)]] βmax}α3 } 11−α1
and in the case of common ownership the equilibrium long-run rate of growth,
γ∗∗, is given by
1 + γ∗∗ = 1 +
{
(1 + λ)
{[
1 − ψ [α1 (1 − σ)]] βm}α3 } 11−α1
It follows that
γ∗ T γ∗∗ ⇔ {1 − ψ [(α1 + α3) (1 − σ)]} βmax T {1 − ψ [α1 (1 − σ)]})βm.
One can readily see that if the median voter is patient, βm = βmax, and inequal-
ity under the private property regime is sufficiently high, (α1 + α3)(1 − σ) > ηˆ,
then common ownership leads to a higher equilibrium rate of growth than private
ownership. If βm < βmax, the possibility that private ownership results in a higher
rate of growth is more likely for lower values of the ratio between the discount
factors of the median and the most patient consumers, βmax/βm, and for lower
elasticity of output in the input of natural resources, α3.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed two Ramsey-type models of economic growth
with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in their intertem-
poral preferences, which leads to different preferences on the rate of resource ex-
traction.
The first model assumes private ownership of the resource stocks. As one
would expect, under the private property regime in the long run all capital and
natural resources are owned by the most patient consumers, who determine the
long-run rate of extraction and the long-run rate of growth.
The second model assumes the resource stocks to be collectively owned and
the resource rent to be equally divided among all the consumers. The consumers
choose the resource extraction rate by voting. For this model we have introduced a
notion of voting equilibrium and fully characterized steady-state voting equilibria.
In particular, we have shown that the long-run extraction rate and the long-run rate
of growth are determined by the discount factor of the median consumer. Some-
what unexpectedly, the long-run rate of growth does not depend on the discount
factor of the most patient consumers.
It follows that if the median consumer belongs to the set of the most patient
consumers, the rates of growth under the two regimes are equal, and if the median
discount factor is lower than that of the most patient consumers, the long-run rate
of growth under the private property regime is higher than under the common
property regime. However, this conclusion is no longer true if the discount factors
are formed endogenously because, as we have shown, in that case under some
circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth than private
property.
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